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THE PREREQUISITES AND EFFECTS OF
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
WARD S. BOwMN, JR.fp RESENT LAW PERMITS the makers of most identifiable products
to fix the prices at which these products may be resold (or
below which they may not be resold) in most states in the
United States. This is permissible on goods which are in free and open
competition with other goods of the same general class,1 and no agree-
ments among competing sellers at any level are sanctioned.' These
"safeguards" to competition provide the basis for the contention that
the fair-trade laws do not eliminate competition or raise prices. The
opposing view is that competition is as important in distribution as in
manufacturing, and that dealer competition is inevitably eliminated.
Consumers are thus limited in the range of choices they may exercise
with respect to service facilities, convenience, or price in the sale of
price-maintenance products.
The makers of many products maintain prices for resale; most do
not. Many producers who maintain prices on some of their products do
not do so on others. A great many reasons have been offered to explain
why resale prices are set.
Part I of this article is an attempt to set out the conditions under
which resale price maintenance has been used, and the objectives which
are sought to be obtained by its use, first by dealers, then by manufac-
turers, and finally by combinations of both. The compatibility of these
conditions and objectives is then related to "free and open competi-
tion." Part II is concerned with empirical evidence on the effects of
resale price maintenance. Included is new information which has been
secured on dentifrice prices in fair-trade and non-fair-trade states cover-
ing the period January, 1951 to January, 1953.
1 Research Associate (Associate Professor), University of Chicago Law School.
'The provision is contained in both the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act. 50
Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (1951); 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. §45 (Supp.,
1952).
2 Ibid.
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I. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE Is UTILIZED
A. Dealer Sponsorship
The early use of resale price maintenance in the drug trade in the
United States, in Great Britain, and in France indicates the importance
of dealer organization and pressure for the establishment of a system
of resale price maintenance.
Price maintenance in drugs in the United States was inaugurated as
wholesale price maintenance in 1876. In that year an association of
western drug wholesalers was formed which was the predecessor of the
National Wholesale Druggists' Association (formed in 1882). This
association was formed for the purpose of dealing with the problem of
"texcessive" competition among wholesalers.8
One of the urgent problems facing the new association was "enticing
away or dissatisfying the customers of others" and "making what are
called 'leaders' in the trade.' 4 From the beginning, the wholesale drug-
gists' association, to solve the loss-leader problem, sponsored what
came to be the established method of marketing proprietaries-the
manufacturer would set the wholesale price and allow a discount to be
deducted upon remittance by wholesalers. This plan, known as the
"Rebate Plan," was sponsored by the wholesalers and presented to the
manufacturers for adoption. The plan was a resale price-maintenance
arrangement; the manufacturers were to pay back to wholesalers at
regular intervals a stipulated percentage of the initial price on condi-
tion that scheduled prices had been maintained.5 It was recognized that
there were disadvantages to manufacturers in carrying out a resale
price-maintenance plan. Manufacturers insisted that the wholesalers
agree not to sell any imitations or close substitutes of the preparations
of the manufacturers signing the agreement.6
Early attempts by retailers to gain the same protection from compe-
tition which resale price maintenance was thought to provide for the
drug wholesalers were unsuccessful. The wholesalers in 1884 did not
react favorably to the retailers' request for protection against price
competition. They resisted in much the same manner as did the manu-
facturers when the wholesalers had made a similar request of their sup-
3 National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, A History of the National Wholesale Druggists'
Association 19 (1924).
'Ibid., at 30.
5 1bid. 6 Ibid., at 34.
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pliers. Moreover, wholesalers considered the retailers' plan impracti-
cable because of the large number of retailers.' Price maintenance at
the retail level was tried by a few manufacturers in the 1880's, 8 al-
though it did not then succeed and was temporarily abandoned in
1885.9
In 1900 a tripartite agreement between the retailers, wholesalers, and
manufacturers was reached. This agreement contained the following
conditions insisted upon by the manufacturers: jobbers were to (1) re-
frain from disparaging proprietary goods, (2) ask no further discounts
from manufacturers than then allowed, (3) discontinue their prepara-
tion of substitutes for the manufacturers' products, and (4) refrain
from selling proprietary preparations, at any price, to aggressive cut-
ters or brokers." Reference to discontinuance by jobbers of their own
substitute preparations suggests that these preparations were making
inroads on proprietary products. The manufacturers wanted assur-
ances concerning this form of competition. Moreover, apprehension
existed among both manufacturers and wholesalers about extending
resale price maintenance to the retail level. It is notable that an
"aggressive cutter" had to be so designated by seventy-five per cent of
the local trade. Such a provision permitted both manufacturers and
wholesalers to make substantial sales to retailers in areas where price-
cutting was typical.
Despite continuing doubt on the part of wholesalers and manufac-
turers concerning the effectiveness or the desirability of retail organiza-
tion, retailers in the drug business exerted increasing influence after
1900. By 1904, when the legality of the tripartite agreement was being
challenged in the courts, it was stated that the drug retailers had al-
ready been successful in "advancing and making uniform the prices
for prescriptions; having proprietors refuse to patronize newspapers
where cut prices were advertised; and doing away with the necessity
for a special request from local retail associations, in order to have
wholesalers refuse to sell to aggressive cutters.""
In Great Britain, as in the United States, the drug distributors played
a predominant role in establishing control over resale price. The Pro-
' One critic of the retailers' plan, Mr. Crittenton, thought the plan an absurdity and re-
marked that it might be made to work only in small cities or towns having not more than
a dozen retail stores. Ibid., at 36.
8 Ibid., at 35. TIbid., at 36.
'o Jayne v. Loder, 149 Fed. 21, 24 (C.A. 3d, 1906).
'Ibid., at 26.
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prietary Articles Trade Association (PATA), dealing in proprietary
medicinal, veterinary, toiletry, and perfumery preparations, claims to
be the first British organization to deal with price-cutting on a national
scale. It was formed in 1896 when price-cutting in Great Britain on
proprietary pharmaceuticals was widespread. 2
In 1895 Sir William Glyn-Jones, who at that time was a retail
pharmacist, had started his own newspaper, The Anti-Cutting Record,
in which he first formulated his plan for ending price-cutting and "sub-
stitution'--getting the customer to buy a "just-as-good" product on
which the retailer received a more satisfactory margin. 3 It was con-
sidered essential that the three interested parties-manufacturer,
wholesaler, and retailer-should cooperate, and that the initiative
should be taken by the retailer.' 4
Securing a wide coverage of retailers presented difficulties in Great
Britain, as in the United States. Because of the apathetic attitude of
retailers it was difficult to achieve full representation of this branch of
the trade. As a result, obtaining cooperation from manufacturers was
made more difficult because of the danger of offending important cus-
tomers.' Other evidence indicates that the manufacturers, for other
reasons, were also something less than enthusiastic.16 The manufac-
turers of brands which had obtained consumer acceptance through ex-
tensive advertising exhibited no eagerness to join the scheme; they took
account of the likely effects of increased prices on their sales.17 More-
over, the pre-packaged articles of these manufacturers were handled
more efficiently by outlets other than the relatively specialized chemist
shops. The entry of new retail outlets handling these items was made
easier.' These other retail outlets, which also opposed resale price
maintenance, could utilize relatively unskilled labor for the simplified
task of selling this pre-packaged merchandise. These factors tended to
increase the amount of competition at retail but was not a situation
'British Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance 40
(1949).
" Ibid. Proprietary lines formed about one half of the turnover of the average retail
chemist at this time.
'A similar tripartite arrangement operated in the United States in the early 1900's. See
note 10 supra.
'5 Op. cit. supra n. 12.
6 See Yamey, Origins of Resale Price Maintenance, 62 Econ. journal 522 (1952).
'1 They also wanted to be assured that if they adopted resale price maintenance their
competitors would do likewise. Ibid., at 535.
- Ibid., at 524.
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which necessarily caused concern for the manufacturers. Those who
considered themselves the "legitimate" dealers were the ones who found
this condition particularly troublesome.
Retailers' organizations in Great Britain favoring resale price main-
tenance had a very difficult time persuading the manufacturers of pro-
prietary articles that the plan was in the manufacturers' interest; the
arguments were not convincing until the organizations represented a
large number of retailers."9 Solidarity of action on the part of the retail-
ers was essential, and this meant, according to Glyn-Jones, the power
effectively to boycott a manufacturer's goods.20
After reviewing the trade literature in Great Britain during the
period 1895 to 1906, Yamey reaches unequivocal conclusions about the
origins of resale price maintenance there. The role of the drug trade
was particularly important but his conclusions are not limited to this
field. As Yamey put it,
First, the initiative to introduce resale price maintenance did not come from the
manufacturers, the great majority of whom were reluctant to move in the matter.
Secondly, the pace at which the reluctance of manufacturers was overcome de-
pended largely upon the strength of retail organisation. Thirdly, the most effective
resistance to the introduction of protected prices came from the owners of well-
established brands.21
Resale price maintenance in the drug industry in France was initi-
ated because of cut-price competition in the distribution of proprietary
drug specialities.22 In France, as in the United States and Great Britain,
price maintenance in drugs was sponsored by resellers, not producers.
The dominant role was played by the retailers.
Prior to the 1850's drugs were typically prepared by the druggist who
dealt with the ultimate consumer. By 1875 it is estimated that fifteen
per cent of the sales of retail druggists in France involved products
which were made by manufacturing firms and sold under the manufac-
turer's trade name.3 Competition among retailers became especially
severe in the sale of these specialties.
Organization of retailers for the purpose of attempting to control the
resale price of proprietary pharmaceuticals first occurred among the
druggists of Versailles in 1886.24 In that year they signed an accord that
they would not sell specialty products at more than ten per cent below
-Ibid., at 529. -Ibid., at 530. 'Ibid., at 540.
'Barret, Histoire du D6veloppement de la Politique aes Prix imposes en France 7, 8
(Paris, 1935).
Ibid., at 9. ' Ibid., at 11.
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the suggested prices posted on the products by the manufacturers.
Sporadic and localized efforts of this kind were not at the time particu-
larly important or typical. Relatively few products were involved.
Moreover, particularly in the larger cities, there was after 1880 a rather
rapid growth of large commercial drugstores. These stores, as con-
trasted to the small pharmacies, which were typically owned and oper-
ated by individuals, relied on quantity sales, high turnover, and low
prices-prices often substantially below list on proprietary items.
At a national convention of druggists in 189825 delegates passed a
motion to suppress drug specialties. By 1903 a majority of druggists
declared themselves in favor of a resale price-maintenance plan for
pharmaceutical specialties.26
French dealers in pharmaceuticals found it difficult to achieve the
necessary co-operation of the manufacturers, 27 but eventually a number
of different systems of supervising resale prices were adopted by the
pharmaceutical manufacturers." By 1933 practically all French drug
stores were participating in a system enforced by means of contractual
sanctions imposed by a strong national association of dealers on the
one side and a national association of producers on the other.
The foregoing examples suggest that resale price maintenance is a
method used by organized dealers to force unwilling manufacturers to
work for them to protect dealer profit margins.2 9 This is a simple,
'In 1885 a society of chemists had been formed in a sector of Paris for the purpose
of combating price-cutting. By December 1893 this society had expanded and became a
general association of French drug stores, the Syndicat G~nral des Pharmacies de France.
Ibid., at 23.
-Ibid., at 22.
' In 1899 the first producer group contained just six pharmaceutical manufacturers. Re-
imbursements of twenty per cent of list price were offered to dealers only on condition
that resale prices were not cut. Ibid., at 38. By 1904 there were 45 members in the pro-
ducers' association. Reimbursements in that year amounted to something over one million
francs. Ibid., at 42. In 1907 there were 56 members in the producers' association. By 1913
there were 220. Ibid., at 70.
Out of a total of ten thousand druggists in 1910, five thousand were members of the
retail druggist group. Ibid., at 86.
1 Some used rebate certificates, some used premiums, and some simple declarations. In
December 1907, all the producers applying any of the various kinds of price-maintenance
schemes were brought together in a single association: Syndicat g6n6ral de la r~glemen-
tation des produits pharmaceutiques ou hygi~niques-sp6ialiss par des marques de fa-
brique. Ibid., at 67.
' The success of dealers in achieving workable resale price maintenance has been said
to be limited by an increase in non-price competition caused by the elimination of price
competition. Although a guaranteed mark-up by the original seller (resale price mainte-
nance) may create conditions favorable to entry of new lines or to additional non-price
competition from existing firms in the form of greater service, these substitute forms of
competition are not likely to be as effective as direct price competition in reducing dealer
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plausible explanation of resale price maintenance, and probably ex-
plains much of its recent as well as its early use. This explanation is
supported by the very high proportion of "fair-trade" cases involving
products the dealers of which have been organized in effective trade
associations, for example, drugs, cosmetics, and liquor. The Federal
Trade Commission Report on Resale Price Maintenance in 1945 also
stressed the importance of dealer organization. This report quotes from
the Illinois Package Liquor Review to emphasize the point:
The pressure and the moral force of the association is responsible more than any
other single factor for whatever price maintenance we have in Chicago .... With
pressure and persuasion, with cajolery and threat, with pestering and pleading, by
convening time and again with distillers and importers, the association officers have
convinced a number of the principal firms of the folly of a continued policy of dog
eat dog.8 0
The fact that resale price maintenance has received strong support
from dealer organizations should not obscure the fact that opposition
is also found among some dealers. Effective opposition to resale price
maintenance has come from retail dealers whose sales policies are predi-
cated upon high turnover, bargain prices, and limited service facilities.3 1
Resale price maintenance prevents this kind of merchandising of price-
maintained products.
Dealers or dealer groups sponsoring resale price maintenance must
represent a fairly large proportion of the potential outlets available to
a particular manufacturer. Otherwise threats or implied threats to
withdraw patronage from a non-co-operating manufacturer may be re-
sisted. Successful price maintenance in the interest of dealers may also
require the co-operation of manufacturers making closely competing
products. Otherwise a price-maintaining manufacturer may lose sales
rapidly because of the lower retail prices available on the products of
his competitors. Of course, the closer the substitute the more necessary
it is that the substitute be price-maintained to prevent its sales from
dissipating the assured margin on the price-maintained product.3 2
profits. The advantages of price-fixing schemes need not last forever, nor create perfect
monopoly, in order to be profitable. A contrary conclusion would mean that price-fixing
cartels are not in the interest of the participants.
' Consult FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance 375 (1945).
' R. H. Macy & Co. in New York, Schwegmann Supermarkets in New Orleans, and the
Grayson-Robinson chain provide examples of strong opposition to resale price mainte-
nance among dealers.
" In those trades where price maintenance has been a goal of dealer organizations, such
as drugs and liquors, most important brands are price-maintained, even though particu-
195s1
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Dealer success in protecting margins by means of resale price main-
tenance also may depend upon the existence of a limited number and
variety of outlets through which a product can effectively be sold.
Concerted action of dealers may be required, and it is more difficult
with large numbers. Moreover, concerted action by dealers' organiza-
tions to force manufacturers to adopt price maintenance is illegal,3 3
just as is similar concerted action among manufacturers. Consequently,
dealers, in attempting to organize their trade, run risks in securing
the necessary co-operation, even when most dealers are in favor of
price maintenance.
Thus, to achieve effective resale price maintenance, dealers must
prevent competition from substitute products and from non-co-operat-
ing outlets. The ability of manufacturers to resist price maintenance
would seem to depend on the relative strength of the dealers and the
manufacturers. Many manufacturers, with well-established brands, or
with relatively few competitors producing close substitutes, have re-
sisted resale price maintenance as the early experience in both Great
Britain and the United States indicates; but there are numerous in-
stances in which combinations of manufacturers did not resist, where
combinations of dealers and combinations of manufacturers have joint-
ly sponsored resale price maintenance. These cases point to the dan-
ger of easy conclusions about countervailing power of manufacturers
precluding resale price maintenance.
B. Sponsorship of Resale Price Maintenance by Manufacturers
Because the price received by the manufacturer is not directly affect-
ed by resale price maintenance (a manufacturer's price to the trade
need be no less or no more because of price maintenance-only the re-
sale price is controlled) and because price competition among dealers
should cause more sales without lowering returns to the manufacturer,
one might expect manufacturers to encourage rather than repress dealer
lar branded products are substantially differentiated. With a very large number of com-
peting manufacturers the administrative job of getting most manufacturers to adopt re-
sale price maintenance becomes more difficult. The existence of numerous competing pro-
ducers presents an obstacle to dealer aims in much the same manner as the existence of a
large number of competing firms does to a union. Consult Stigler, The Theory of Price
253 (1952): "Until a large number of enterprises are unionized, the union has little power
to raise wages. If there are many firms there are usually many new firms, so unionization
is a continuous task."
' See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
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competition. Indeed, this is actually the position taken by many manu-
facturers upon whom dealer pressure for fixed margins is exerted.34
No manufacturer can be expected to favor the equivalent of a retailing
tax levied on his product. The fact remains, however, that a great many
manufacturers actively support resale price maintenance, 5 even
though their dealers are not organized to present the kind of united
front found among drug and liquor dealers. Among the numerous ex-
planations of sponsorship by manufacturers of resale price maintenance
are (1) the protection of manufacturers' good will, (2) the maximiza-
tion of returns from advertising, (3) the creation of product differen-
tiation in order to prevent competition from substitutes, (4) the pro-
tection from the elimination of retail outlets through loss leaders, (5)
price stabilization, (6) price discrimination, and (7) assurance of
dealer services required for the marketing of a product.
" The American Fair Trade Council, an association of manufacturers favoring fair
trade, strongly objects to the generalization that price maintenance is due to coercion by
dealers. In July, 1951 the Council, representing a widely diversified group of industries,
indicated that it did not want to be identified with fair trade by coercion. Care was taken
to dissociate the position of the Council from that taken by the beverage and pharma-
ceutical industries. The Council claimed "a much greater volume of products under volun-
tary fair trade than are provided by the beverage and pharmaceutical industries." Hear-
ings on Resale Price Maintenance before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on the judiciary. 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 889 (1952). An anti-coercion resolution was
adopted by the Council.
36Among the manufacturing firms sponsoring resale price maintenance through early
membership in the American Fair Trade League, established in 1912, were the makers
of a wide variety of well-known products, including: Victor and Edison Talking Machines,
Ford and Packard motor cars, Welch's grape juice, Kellogg's corn flakes, B.V.D.'s, Inger-
soll and Hamilton watches, Beechnut products, Bissell carpet sweepers, Waterman pens,
Putnam books, and many others. Johnson, Ingersoll, and Montague, Control of Resale
Prices 110 (1936). Other manufacturers who supported resale price maintenance prior to
and during this period included the makers of Old Dutch Cleanser [Frey & Son, Inc. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921)]; Ghirardelli chocolate [D. Ghirardelli Co. v.
Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355 (1912)]; Standard Fashion dress patterns [Weiboldt v. The
Standard Fashion Co., 80 Ill. App. 67 (1898)]; Oneida Community silverware [Johnson,
What Is a Fair Price?, 79 Printers' Ink No. 13, at 3 (1912)]; Eastman Kodak cameras
and films [United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W.D. N.Y., 1915)]; Inter-
national Harvester farm implements [International Harvester Co. of America v. Common-
wealth, 124 Ky. 543 (1907)]; Loose-Wiles tea biscuits [Cherington, Interlocking Sales
Campaign of Loose-Wiles Biscuit Company, 81 Printers' Ink No. 13, at 17 (1912)]; Clark's
thread [Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885)]; Union sewer pipe [Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902)]; Dwight's "Cow-Brand" saleratus and soda [Walsh
v. Dwight, 40 App. Div. 513, 58 N.Y. Supp. 91 (1st Dep't, 1899)]; and Keystone watch
cases [United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502 (E.D. Pa., 1915)]. Others
included makers of Gillette razors, Japalac paint, Klaxon warning signals, Prophylactic
tooth brushes, Smith & Wesson revolvers, Thermos bottles, Spaulding baseballs, Simplex
pencil sharpeners, Wright & Ditson tennis rackets, Moore push pins, and Carborundum
stones, to name a few. See 79 Printers' Ink No. 13, at 3 (1912).
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PROTECTION OF MANUFACTURERS' GOOD WILL
It has been said that if a retailer cuts price and if the differentiation
(that which makes the consumer prefer one particular manufacturer's
product over another) is tenuous or "psychic," price-cutting will tend
to shift customers from brand to brand and will thus break down the
"good will" value of the mark or name which advertising has built up,
wasting part of the advertising. 6 Thus, if the makers of Lucky Strikes
and the makers of Camels could keep their dealers from competing,
the Camel smokers would be more likely to continue smoking Camels,
Lucky Strike smokers Lucky Strikes, and so on, and all would be
better off. There is a fatal difficulty with this explanation. Cigarette
manufacturers do not find it in their interests to use resale price main-
tenance. In fact, cigarette manufacturers find it not at all troublesome
that supermarkets and grocery chains make a large proportion of
cigarette sales to customers by selling in cartons at cut prices. Nor has
this kind of competition led to any noticeable diminution of cigarette
advertising which stresses the unique advantages of particular brands.
In selling cigarettes at retail it is not to be expected that one major
brand is cut in price while others are not. It is probably true that price
cuts by dealers in cigarettes leave the relative price of the brands un-
affected and do not provide incentive for customers to switch brands.
It is not clear that such price-maintained products as toothpaste,
toasters, or light bulbs are greatly different from cigarettes in this
respect.
ADVERTISING AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Of the one hundred companies having the largest national advertising
expenditures in 1950, fifty utilized resale price maintenance on at least
one of the products sold.37 Among the companies which do maintain
prices many do so only on particular items making up a small propor-
tion of total sales. Undoubtedly a similar diversity would be found
Consult Galbraith, Monopoly Power and Price Rigidities, 50 Q. J. Econ. 468-70 (1936).
STwenty-nine of these fifty companies using price maintenance were neither in the
drug or liquor industry nor sold a product or products principally through drug or liquor
store outlets. Of these 29 firms, 9 were firms principally engaged in manufacturing food
products, 3 were tire and rubber companies, 2 were tobacco companies, and 2 were soap
companies. Op. cit. supra note 34, at 360-61. With one possible exception (Pillsbury
Mills), all of these 16 companies principally manufacture and sell products which are not
price-maintained. Such is the case with most food products, tires and cigarettes. On the
other hand, a number of companies are included which are known to make use of resale
price maintenance extensively. These include General Electric, Westinghouse, Electric
Auto-Lite, Champion, Ronson, International Silver, and Doubleday. Ibid.
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among smaller firms. There appears to be no correlation between ad-
vertising expenditures and the use of resale price maintenance. The
argument that advertising expenses are wasted because of the break-
down of product differentiation caused by price competition and loss
leaders is dealt with elsewhere."
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND SUBSTITUTES
The interest of a manufacturer in resale price maintenance is said
to arise from the necessity of creating and maintaining product dif-
ferentiation. Advertising of trade names, trade marks, and patents
promotes differentiation. Selling and advertising expenses, unless joint-
ly undertaken, are not likely to be great if products are undifferentiated,
since the advertising of one manufacturer of a homogeneous product
may produce as much advantage for his competitors as for himself.
There is the possibility that the non-advertiser may get a "free ride"
on the advertising and sales promotion of others. High selling costs and
significant product differentiation characterize many, if not most, manu-
factured products, only some of which are typically price-maintained.
Toothpaste is price-maintained, cigarettes are not; electric shavers are
price-maintained, radios are not; spark plugs are price-maintained,
tires are not. All are differentiated products with high advertising and
selling costs. Product differentiation alone is not a sufficient reason for
resale price maintenance.
An additional factor, sometimes specified in an effort to explain
manufacturers' interest in resale price maintenance, relates to the char-
acteristics of demand for the product. If resale price maintenance is
not to be harmful to a manufacturer, the demand for the product must
be such that lowered price through dealer competition will not increase
sales as much as some other demand-increasing activity with which
dealer price competition is incompatible.
When retail (or wholesale) dealers provide an essential part of the
advertising or selling activity required to market a product, and there
is no alternative method other than resale price maintenance by which
dealers may be remunerated for this service, then price maintenance
may be desirable to manufacturers. Professor Chamberlin has pointed
up the importance of selling costs incurred to create new demand."9
Ability of particular dealers to create demand for certain products,
according to Chamberlin, arises because of close relations between
See pages 835-38 infra.
' Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 120 (6th ed., 1950).
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the dealer and his customers, and the ability of a dealer to stock and
push certain products at the expense of others. A manufacturer must
not leave dealer relations to price competition; dealer favors must be
bought, and they must be paid for. This emphasizes the control which
particular retailers can exercise over their trade. Analytically, power
exerted by an individual dealer is not different from power exerted by
organized dealers, a case already discussed. The amount of pressure
single unorganized dealers can exert on manufacturers, however, is like-
ly to be limited. Consequently, other alternatives may be available to
manufacturers in the absence of organized boycotting. Moreover, it
is in the interest of single dealers to carry widely advertised and ac-
cepted products (such as major-brand cigarettes or Coca Cola) whether
or not they are price-maintained. On the other hand, manufacturers
bringing new products on the market may find special dealer aids
(which resale price maintenance pays for) essential to their marketing
plans.
Loss LEADERS
One of the most frequently cited reasons for a manufacturer's in-
terest in resale price maintenance is the allegedly adverse effect of
"loss-leader" sales. Many manufacturers express concern when prices
are cut below the costs of efficient outlets, both because of a fear that
the number of dealer outlets will be reduced and because of a fear that
loss leaders will break down product differentiation and encourage
substitution. It is argued that the "loss leader" is in reality a "mis-
leader." Customers are lured into a dealer's establishment by ad-
vertised bargains; when they arrive they are sold a "just-as-good"
product bringing the dealer a better margin. Price maintenance is at
best only a partial solution to the misleader problem, if indeed it is any
solution at all. Although price maintenance prevents "price-cutting
dealers" from advertising a particular product at a bargain price, it
does not prevent, but encourages, adverse price comparisons once cus-
tomers are in a store. Only insofar as substitution is possible is there
a misleader problem. If price maintenance increases the price dis-
crepancy between the fair-trade product and the non-fair-trade product,
substitution may be encouraged. For example, the retail sporting goods
section of a large mail-order house stocks one or two nationally ad-
vertised, price-maintained rifles primarily for the purpose of adverse
comparison (in terms of price and quality) with its own brand.
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If retail prices are cut to or below the cost of the most efficient out-
lets, sales may be concentrated through relatively few dealers. It is the
fear that this will drive out all but a few dealers which is said to make
price maintenance in the manufacturers' interest. In the long run, the
argument goes, price-maintaining manufacturers will sell more by sales
through many dealers than through few dealers even though prices
are higher. This means that sales are deemed to be more responsive
to convenience and service than to price. It has not been established,
however, that loss leaders decrease sales. The Federal Trade Com-
mission in its Report on Resale Price Maintenance in 1931 was unable
to find examples of price cuts decreasing manufacturers' sales.4 0 The
report states:
The Commission has been at some pains to discover instances of such price cutting
which were sufficiently severe to result in permanent and material reduction of the
manufacturer's volume of business, but without discovering any instances in which
it could be satisfactorily shown that decreased volume was primarily due to dealer
price cutting.41
The Federal Trade Commission, however, has not convinced manu-
facturers that they do not recognize their own interests. Even though
no data confirming the fact that cut prices have reduced sales have
been made available, some manufacturers stress the vital importance
of a large number of outlets. The McGraw Electric Company, the
maker of a well-known, price-maintained toaster, cites the following
example:
[D]uring the last Christmas season [1951], we found it quite impossible to carry
out our seasonal promotional plans in the San Francisco area. This was due to the
deep price cutting of one chain organization. Other stores, large and small, refused
to meet these extremely low prices and, of course, would not co-operate in our
merchandising plans. All dealers are reluctant to participate in merchandising ex-
penditures aimed at creating willingness to buy if some other dealer, large or small,
is able to get a free ride by selling at cut prices relying on the good will and accept-
ance which he has not helped to create.42
The inference from this is that fewer toasters were sold in San Fran-
cisco during the Christmas holidays than if the price had not been cut
by a chain store. Evidence comparing sales in San Francisco and in
other areas where prices were not cut, or other evidence that the price
cuts diminished sales, has not been produced.
A reduction in the number of dealers is also said to have an addi-
'*FTC, 2 Report on Resale Price Maintenance 4 (1931).
" Ibid.
"Brief in Support of H. R. 6925 for McGraw Electric Co. at 11 (1952).
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tional adverse effect on manufacturers. If unrestricted price competi-
tion will eliminate many outlets, manufacturers may find themselves
at the mercy of a few powerful dealers. There is little evidence to
support this argument. No single retail establishment actually does a
large proportion of the business in single commodities. In large metro-
politan markets such as New York City, where price-cutting is said
to be most prevalent, the competition among firms which use price
appeals in selling merchandise is most intense. It has never seriously
been contended, for example, that R. H. Macy sells at very low prices
with the purpose or with the likely result that its competitors, includ-
ing such firms as Gimbel's, Bloomingdale's, Abraham & Straus, etc.,
will be driven out of business, and that as a result Macy's will sub-
sequently be in a position to raise prices and exact monopoly returns 3
STABILIZATION OF MANUFACTURERS' PRICES
Resale price maintenance has most often arisen as a concession by
manufacturers to organized distributors in exchange for other conces-
sions by dealers to manufacturers. But even in the absence of dealer
pressure, manufacturers have an interest in avoiding price competi-
tion among themselves. Although direct agreement with respect to
prices is illegal, avoidance of price competition may be accomplished
by a mutual recognition of the losses which might occur to all if any
one manufacturer were to cut prices. Resale price maintenance, by
stabilizing dealer prices, may make it less likely that manufacturers'
prices are cut.
Instability of prices among dealers is said to cause uncertainty among
manufacturers as to whether or not rival manufacturers are cutting
prices. It is contended, therefore, that the stability which price main-
tenance affords to manufacturers' prices can outweigh the advantages
of more active dealer competition. Moreover, it may be argued that
although an agreement or an understanding among manufacturers to
fix resale prices would be just as illegal as would a direct price-fixing
agreement, the former does not require continued joint action for en-
forcement and therefore creates less risk of having a "conspiracy"
established.
The notion that resale price maintenance, by stabilizing dealer prices,
will make it less likely that rival manufacturers will cut their prices
analogizes price competition with contagious disease. Presumably the
"It has been argued that fair-trade laws, by preventing abusive price wars, have an
anti-monopoly effect. Ibid., at 14.
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price competition among dealers will spread to manufacturers in the
form of increased pressure for lower supply prices, resulting in price
concessions. Even if the predicted effect on manufacturers' prices does
not occur, suspicion can be aroused among the manufacturers that
rivals are "chiseling," undermining the manufacturers' understanding.
This explanation of manufacturers' sponsorship of price maintenance
is unconvincing for several reasons. An extremely tenuous. arrange-
ment or understanding among manufacturers is assumed, one which
is likely to collapse at the slightest provocation. Moreover, the explana-
tion involves an assumption that dealers have less incentive to seek and
manufacturers to grant price concessions when minimum resale prices
are in force than when they are not. This fails to explain why any
manufacturer desiring to expand sales at the expense of other manu-
facturers could not do so as easily by extending lower prices to dealers
who would retain the savings, as by extending lower prices to dealers
who would pass them on by cutting prices.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
General Electric, which produced or licensed the production of 93
per cent of the total lamp production in the early 1920's, marketed
incandescent lamps under agency contracts, fixing the price and the
conditions under which lamps could be sold by its dealers.44 A large
percentage of the lamps produced was sold by General Electric and
its licensees to large contract buyers, and the remainder were sold
through a vast number of retail agents to individual consumers.45
These retail outlets performed no unique service functions. Here, if
anywhere, one might have expected that the advantages of a maximum
of price competition among retailers along with lower prices to con-
sumers would have been in the interest of the patent-holding producers.
There were no close substitutes for the product sold, no danger of
diverted sales through loss leaders, and little opportunity for retailers
to promote greater sales by non-price than by price appeals.
The explanation for this complex, price-fixing mechanism lies in
"United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
'" At the time the government brought its case against General Electric, only 41 per cent
of total lamp sales were made through agents to domestic users; 59 per cent were made
to large-contract concerns (22 per cent without use of agents and 37 per cent through
agent distributors, including retailers). For Westinghouse, the principal licensee of Gen-
eral Electric, only 34 per cent of sales were made through agents to domestic customers,
36 per cent were sold without agents to large-contract concerns, and 30 per cent were sold
through agents to large-contract concerns. Transcript of Record at 92, 93 (stipulation),
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). Each of the large-contract
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price discrimination. Lamp customers could be divided into two
markets, domestic and industrial (contract sales). Successful discrim-
ination depended on avoiding diversion either by industrial users or
by distributors. As a result, each of the large contract buyers, whether
he bought direct or through distributor agents, agreed that no lamp
bought would be resold.
Although the facts of the General Electric case indicate that indus-
trial lamp users were prevented by contract from reselling to others,
it is not clear that resale price maintenance generally would prevent the
breakdown of a discriminatory pricing scheme. Diversion by dealers
also needs to be prevented. Resale price maintenance would attempt
to prevent dealers from supplying domestic users at cut prices out of
lower cost supplies destined for industrial users. But resale price main-
tenance would not eliminate the incentive for dealers to increase their
margins by diverting at the maintained price. Resale price maintenance
has little to do with keeping two markets separate. The danger of diver-
sion is always a problem to a discriminating seller, but a careful polic-
ing scheme would seem to be called for irrespective of whether resale
price maintenance or its equivalent is utilized.
SERVICE AND NON-SERVICE MARKETS
Although knowledge about the status of competition in many dis-
tributive trades is far from precise, resale price maintenance appears
to be sponsored in situations which can be described as involving
monopoly power by manufacturers and competition among distributors.
A single seller with a unique product, or a group of sellers, either by
agreement or through price leadership, may find price maintenance
essential to successful merchandising. Examples are the early manu-
facture of phonographs under an effective patent monopoly,4 6 the use
buyers, whether they bought direct or through distributor agents, agreed that no lamps
bought would be resold. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 482-84 (1926).
"'Phonograph manufacturers were involved in extensive price-maintenance litigation:
Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufmann, 105 Fed. 960 (C.C. Pa., 1901) (involved agreement
not to sell below list on the patented Edison phonograph in 1901) ; Edison Phonograph
Co. v. Pike, 116 Fed. 863 (C.C. Mass., 1902) (dealer contracts containing clauses pro-
hibiting supply of Edison phonographs, parts, records, or blanks, to any dealer not sign-
ing a price-maintenance agreement); National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed. 733
(C.A. 8th, 1904) (involving resale price maintenance on the phonograph covered by Edi-
son Phonograph Co. patents; National Phonograph Co. was then Edison's exclusive sales
agent). Victor Talking Machine Co. utilized the same kind of resale price-maintenance
agreement, also based on a patent license. See Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair,
123 Fed. 424 (C.A. 7th, 1903); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810
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of resale price maintenance by the Ford Motor Co.,47 which had a
dominant position in that field, and the use of resale price maintenance
as part of a campaign to introduce a new product.4" In these examples
an assumption that dealers were in a position to dictate terms to the
suppliers seems implausible.
These examples seem to run counter to the economic principle that
a monopolist on one level (here the manufacturer) can maximize his
return by setting the original price only. It would strain credulity to
suggest that Ford and Victor represent cases of philanthropy to
dealers. An alternative explanation is called for. Many products re-
quire dealer service and extensive selling effort. If dealers can be re-
munerated for this service either directly by the supplier or indirectly
by the purchaser's paying a higher price, a monopoly manufacturer
maximizes his return by setting the proper price on the first sale. Such
services as customer credit, local advertising, dealer displays, or
special sales promotions usually entail costs for which dealers may be
(CA. 3d, 1921); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917). In the latter
case two other phonograph companies filed a brief as amid curiae in support of the legal-
ity of resale price-maintenance contracts.
""The Ford Motor Co., along with the Packard Motor Co., represented the auto indus-
try among the original members of the American Fair Trade League. Mr. Lucking,
representing the Ford Motor Co., summarized the company's experience in 1914 before
the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on Trust Legislation before the House Com-
mittee on the judiciary, 63d Cong. 2d Sess. 767 (1914). According to Lucking there were
special reasons in the automobile industry for fixing resale prices. In 1913, due to the size
it had achieved, Ford established an agency system for its dealers. It was a Ford policy
to see that Ford cars were sold at uniform prices within exclusive dealers' territories. This
system provided a double protection for dealers and was said to be occasioned by the
need for prompt and loyal service. "The relation between the Ford Motor Co. and its
product is not completed when it has received the price paid by the dealer. This relation
continues on during the entire life of the machine sold, and the success of that machine
is regarded as of vital consequence to the company." Ibid., at 768. (The same point was
made with respect to watches by Charles L. Miller, president of the Hamilton Watch Co.,
ibid., at 786.) In 1914, 6,000 Ford dealers were under contract obligation to stock parts
for quick repairs and were entrusted with showing a purchaser "how to use, handle and
conserve a car." "[T]hese things," according to Lucking, "are not done by a cut-price
dealer and the car loses its reputation and Ford loses its best dealers. Hence follow dis-
satisfied customers,... loss of sales, loss of business." Ibid., at 769. An outsider can afford
to cut prices when the other man has stood the expense of working up the sale. The out-
sider in effect gets a "free ride" on the efforts of the seller.
' Erlanger Bros., predecessor to the B.V.D. Co., first commercialized the idea of making
summer underwear in knee drawers and coat-cut undershirts. Ibid., at 733. The idea was
deemed most radical, and met with wide derision in the trade. Much missionary work
was required and it was necessary even to donate garments to friends in the trade to con-
vince them of their advantages. The task of getting jobbers and dealers to stock and push
the new product was a formidable one. Protecting the dealers' margin through resale price
maintenance was a part of the means by which the new product was introduced.
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directly reimbursed. 9 Circumstances may arise, however, in which
dealers cannot be reimbursed for essential services except through their
price margins. Many products, especially new ones, the use of which
requires particular knowledge or special skill, may require costly dem-
onstrations or services by the dealer which it is not possible for the
dealer to charge for directly or for the manufacturer to pay for direct-
ly. If the item sold is of such nature that a customer may get his serv-
ice from a service dealer and a cut price from a non-service dealer, the
manufacturer may suffer because of the elimination of service outlets."0
The usefulness of resale price maintenance to manufacturers when
competitive conditions exist among dealers can best be illustrated by
assuming an extreme case in which there is just one manufacturer and
a large number of dealers. When all of these dealers sell in one market,
a single price set by the manufacturer to the dealers will maximize his
monopoly return. If, however, there is one market in which the product
alone is demanded and another in which the product plus service is
required, and these markets overlap so that the manufacturer cannot
sell his product at different prices (lower to the service dealers than
to the non-service dealers), and if a buyer needing service can pro-
cure it from a service outlet and yet purchases from a non-service out-
let at a competitive price, not reflecting service cost, the manufacturer
is faced with a difficult question of sales policy. Since service dealers
cannot provide service without recovering its cost, the manufacturer
must choose between supporting the service dealers or the non-service
"Such payments or discounts may violate the Robinson-Patman Act. 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.CA. §§ 13, 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1951). This act, although generally de-
scribed as an anti-discrimination statute, creates a presumption that special prices or par-
ticular allowances are "discriminatory" unless they can be accurately justified by costs
[15 U.S.C.A. § 13(b) (1951)]; even then serious risks are run if it is possible to impute
an intent to monopolize from unequal prices. Consequently, some manufacturers may not
wish to take the legal risks involved in making special payments to dealers even when
clearly related to economic services performed by the dealers. Consult Adelman, The Con-
sistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 Stanford L. Rev. 3 (1954).
' The need for special dealer services may give rise to exclusive selling agencies under
some circumstances, but resale price maintenance for most products is a better solution
for manufacturers because it eliminates only dealer price competition (and not service
competition). The Waterman Pen Co., for example, an early advocate of resale price main-
tenance, at one time felt obligated to explain why its dealers could not have exclusive
franchises. Consult Hall, As the Retailer Sees It, 76 Printers' Ink No. 12, at 8 (1912).
The argument was: "'Experience shows that you could sell three or four of the success-
ful kind [Waterman's] while endeavoring to induce a customer to purchase one of the
other kind for which you might have an exclusive agency .... You must consider that
there is really no severe competition in the selling of Waterman's Ideal fountain pens,
because they must be absolutely sold at the same stipulated price by every merchant who
stocks them.'" Ibid., at 12.
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dealers. If the reduction in total sales occasioned by forcing non-serv-
ice dealers to sell at prices reflecting service costs, as under resale
price maintenance, is less than the reduction in sales occasioned by the
elimination of dealer service, then the setting of a minimum resale
price clearly benefits the original seller. 5
Describing resale price maintenance when used for the purpose of
insuring dealer service as creating a "spilling-over effect"52 suggests
the possibility of a windfall return to non-service dealers. Customers
requiring the service can buy the product from non-service dealers as
long as free service continues to be provided by service dealers. This
does not mean that non-service dealers receive a windfall return, for,
assuming that competition among them will undercut the maintained
price, they will receive only the competitive return.
It is impossible to estimate how much resale price maintenance is
to be explained by the existence of overlapping markets. This phenom-
enon may be fairly common where costly technical instruction by
dealers is a necessary part of a successful sales program. In addition
to the examples cited, such price-maintained products as high-speed
cameras, color film, optical products, and some forms of sporting equip-
ment might well fall in this category. Moreover, it seems likely that
this kind of need for resale price maintenance may exist when a prod-
uct is being introduced, but that the dissemination of information to
customers may eventually enlarge the non-service market so that
support of the service market is no longer good policy for the manu-
facturer.
There are cases of sponsorship of resale price maintenance by manu-
facturers selling in ostensibly competitive dealer markets which remain
unexplained. The long-continued insistence by the Ingersoll brothers
that their famous "dollar" watch be fair-traded is an example. 3 It
was sold through innumerable retail outlets including drug, hardware,
novelty, and cigar stores. Currently the insistence upon maintained
resale prices by the makers of small electrical appliances, including
such firms as Sunbeam, McGraw Electric, Westinghouse, and General
Electric, remains to be explained, unless the competitiveness of distri-
bution in these trades has been misjudged.
' Even if a monopoly manufacturer owned all outlets (service and non-service), the
equivalent of resale price maintenance would be required to recover necessary service costs.
52 Consult Resale Price Maintenance and the Anti-Trust Laws, U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369,
376 (1951).
' Johnson, Ingersoll, and Montague, Control of Resale Prices (1936).
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C. Joint Sponsorship by Dealers and Manufacturers
Resale price maintenance has been used as a part of a broader
scheme involving horizontal agreements. Resale price maintenance in
the American book trade indicates close co-operation among book
dealers and publishers. The American Booksellers' Association was
formed in June, 1901, very shortly after the formation of the American
Publishers' Association in February, 1901." The close proximity of the
dates of organization suggests co-operative action, or at least that each
group knew what the other was doing. The success of either association
was said to depend upon the co-operation of the other. In this respect
the situation in the book trade in America at the turn of the century
was similar to that in the American drug trade under the tripartite
arrangement in effect at about the same time.5 In each case the arrange-
ment contemplated co-operation among competitors at both the manu-
facturer and dealer levels.
Although the initiative for resale price maintenance appears to be
strong among publishers in the United States, the strong interest of
booksellers in the plan must not be discounted. The first resolution of
the first meeting of the American Booksellers' Association in 1901
called for acceptance of the publishers' net price system on condition
that fiction books be included under the net price system as rapidly
as possible. 8 The association further agreed not to keep in stock, or
offer for sale after notification, the books of any publisher who did
not support the net price system." Provision was also made for expel-
ling members who did not abide by the fixed prices and for not dealing
with other booksellers who cut prices.58 Cut-price booksellers were
forced to pay full retail list price. This combination of booksellers
included at least 90 per cent of all booksellers, and the pubishers'
association included a large proportion of publishers."9
A number of other cases of what appear to be manufacturers' spon-
sorship of resale price maintenance prior to and during the early 1900's
coupled resale price maintenance with plans to eliminate or diminish
competition among manufacturers. The resale price maintenance pro-
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 139 Fed. 155, 158 (C.C. N.Y., 1905).
Op. cit. supra note 10.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 139 Fed. 155, 160 (C.C. N.Y., 1905).
Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n., 85 App. Div. 446, 83 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1st Dep't,
1903).
'Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 139 Fed. 155, 160 (C.C. N.Y., 1905).
- Ibid., at 159, 174.
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visions included in these broader schemes may be viewed as a means
of extending to dealers a quid pro quo for an agreement not to deal
in the products of competing manufacturers. This use of resale price
maintenance (as part of a larger agreement designed to monopolize
trade) is exemplified by early antitrust cases involving wallpaper,60
enameled iron ware,61 whiskey,6 and watch cases. 6 When the number
of producers is small, the same results have been achieved without
formal agreement through price leadership. Fashion patterns 4 and
' Continental Wallpaper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909) (see exhibits 1
and 2 reproduced therein), involved a combination of more than thirty formerly com-
peting concerns, which manufactured and sold upwards of 98 per cent of all the wall-
paper sold in the United States. These formerly competing firms, while maintaining their
separate plants and identities, placed themselves under the control of a committee which
would decide the amount of production (based on capacity), patterns to be produced,
prices to be charged, equalization of freight, and classification of dealers. In addition, re-
sale prices by jobbers were jointly fixed by contract. Margins were guaranteed to jobbers,
but they were obliged to purchase solely from members of the combination.
' In Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912), manufacturers
of 85 per cent of the country's enameled ironware joined together for the purpose of con-
trolling the output and the price of these articles. The combination was organized by
means of a patent licensing arrangement whereby Standard Sanitary's competitors became
licensees under Standard Sanitary's patents. The agreement covered selling schedules, royal-
ties, and the selling price to jobbers (to be determined by a committee of manufacturers),
and included penalty provisions for price violations. Ibid., at 43. There was a provision
for return of 80 per cent of the royalty if provisions of the agreement were adhered to.
The agreement with the jobbers and dealers provided that they could not deal in the
products of others not licensed under the agreement, and that resale prices as established
from time to time were to be strictly maintained by jobbers and dealers. Sales could not
be made from one jobber to another for any better prices than "established by the sheets."
Ibid., at 46. Sales were not made to jobbers and dealers who did not join the arrange-
ment. Resale price maintenance was an inducement to jobbers and dealers to execute the
agreements. Wayman, who directed the manufacturers at the time, wrote to jobbers point-
ing out that this was "a matter entirely for the jobbers' benefit" and "[would] be much
more advantageous than a continuous cut market." Ibid., at 47.
' An early combination of distillers used resale price maintenance to secure exclusive-
dealing contracts with distributors. In U.S. v. Greenhut, 51 Fed. 205 (N.D. Ohio, 1892),
the defendant had acquired some 70 distilleries and controlled over three quarters of the
distillery output in the United States. Distillers' distributors were given rebates if they
sold at not less than the price fixed and if they bought only goods produced by the de-
fendants.
' A similar arrangement was attempted in the sale of watch cases. In Deuber Watch-
Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 66 Fed. 637 (C.A. 2d, 1895), the com-
plaint alleged that beginning in 1887, some 20 defendants mutually agreed to refuse to
sell their goods to anyone who did not purchase exclusively from them and to maintain
a fixed price on all goods manufactured by them.
"Pattern-makers used resale price-maintenance agreements in conjunction with agree-
ments not to deal in the products of competitors for many years prior to the Supreme
Court decision in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston, 258 U.S. 346 (1922). At
that time two firms, Butterick and McCall's, probably did 80 per cent of the fashion busi-
ness done through retail stores in the United States. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston, 259 Fed. 793, 798, 803 (CA. 1st, 1919).
A large amount of litigation regarding dealer contracts involving the pattern sales of a
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sparkplugs 5 are examples; both of these industries contain very few
firms.
In the foregoing examples manufacturers were organized or were
few in number and dealer co-operation was sought in the form of agree-
ments or understandings not to deal with competing manufacturers.
Manufacturers in turn guaranteed resale margins by means of resale
price maintenance. The plans for exclusive distribution appear to have
been sponsored by the manufacturers, but resale price maintenance was
generally recognized also to be in the interest of the dealers.
These examples suggest an attempt to enlarge the advantage of both
dealers and manufacturers by "trading" or "bargaining." The inclusion
in the agreements of clauses preventing the dealers from buying the
products of concerns competing with the organized manufacturers was
an attempt by manufacturers to lessen the advantages of competitors
or to protect themselves from the growth of outsiders. Not dealing
with outsiders was costly to the organized dealers. It had to be paid
for. The price was resale price maintenance for the dealers.
Two assumptions are implicit in this explanation of resale price
maintenance. First, the advantage gained for dealers by the elimination
of price competition among them must outweigh the loss which they
suffer by being prohibited from dealing with certain suppliers or poten-
number of companies over an extended period reveals that the contracts almost uniformly
provided for twice-yearly return of old patterns for full or 9/10ths credit on new patterns,
an agreement not to deal in the patterns of competitors, sales and display on a ground
floor location near the front door, and resale price maintenance of the pattern prices. See
Weiboldt v. Standard Fashion Co., 80 Ill. App. 67 (1898); Butterick Publishing Co. v.
Rose, 141 Wis. 533, 124 N.W. 647 (1910); Peerless Pattern Co. v. Gauntlett Dry Goods
Co., 171 Mich. 158, 136 N.W. 1113 (1912); Sullivan v. Rime, 35 S.D. 75, 150 N.W. 556
(1915); Pictorial Review Co. v. Pate Bros., 185 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916). The
McCall Company modified its dealer contracts after the decision of the Supreme Court
in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), but in actual effect the
practice remained the same. McCall's dealers could take competing lines and sell at any
price, but if they did, McCall would not take back unsold patterns for credit. This in ef-
fect required both resale price maintenance and exclusive dealing if McCall's patterns were
to be handled. See Hearings on Trust Legislation before the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 63d Cong. 2d Sess. 1006 (1914).
'In the sale of spark plugs, a field dominated by three firms, Champion, A-C (General
Motors), and Electric-Autolite, all of which price-maintain, a large proportion of sales
are made through gasoline service stations or through the service departments of automo-
bile dealers. General Motors and its dealers use and sell A-C plugs exclusively; Chrysler
cars come equipped with the Autolite product and dealers handle this brand; while Ford
and most other makers equip with and sell Champion plugs exclusively. A similar situ-
ation exists with service stations. Standard Oil Co. service stations, for example, which
carry and sell their own brand of Atlas tires, batteries, and other accessories, sell Atlas-
Champion spark plugs exclusively. They are assured that the same or similar Champion
plugs may not be purchased at auto supply stores or mail-order houses at lower prices.
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tial suppliers. Second, for manufacturers the opposite must be true.
That is, the advantage to manufacturers of exclusive dealer outlets
must outweigh the disadvantage of having no price competition in dis-
tribution. These conditions seem most likely to be met when there are
relatively few manufacturers and relatively large-scale operation is
required for efficient production; for then, foreclosing all but a small
proportion of the dealer outlets makes it more difficult for outside
manufacturers to reach efficient size. If, however, it takes relatively
few dealers to support an efficient manufacturer, both the dealer
organization (which depends on co-operation from manufacturers for
successful operation) and the manufacturer organization are more
likely to be undermined.
Other factors are also pertinent to the evaluation of the possible
success of agreements between dealers and manufacturers. If the market
demand for the product (as contrasted to the demand for the product
of each manufacturer) is relatively insensitive to price changes, guaran-
teeing resellers' margins is less costly to manufacturers and more ad-
vantageous to dealers. Also, if the co-operating manufacturers make
trade-marked or branded products which have high consumer accept-
ance, which is maintained in part by the organized dealers, the entry
of competing manufacturers will be more difficult.
If these vertical agreements are to benefit the manufacturers in the
way described (adverse effect on outsiders or new entrants), the case
would seem to be analytically indistinguishable from the proposition
that vertical integration prolongs monopoly by imposing greater capital
requirements on prospective entrants. This view, although widely held,
has been seriously questioned.66
Foreclosing dealer outlets to prospective manufacturers means in
effect that new competition requires entrance on both levels at once.
If, however, there are greater than competitive profits, the question is
raised as to why the increased capital necessary is not forthcoming.67
But apart from capital requirements it is possible that risks of success-
ful entry are increased by vertical agreement. When the range and
diversity of product sales required for successful operation on one level
(reselling) is much broader than the other (manufacturing), it is pos-
sible that combining the proper proportions for successful operation on
each level is a complicated, risky, time-consuming process. Securing
' Consult Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 157,
195 (1954).
'Ibid.
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dealer customers is not costless, as the makers of the Kaiser auto-
mobile knew or learned.
The possible usefulness of resale price maintenance when both sellers
and resellers are organized is suggested by bilateral monopoly analysis."'
Here the interests of the seller and the buyer (reseller) are presumed to
be in conflict. In the absence of agreement, output and price are in-
determinate, and an output (or prices) which will maximize joint return
will not be reached. This is to say that vertical agreement makes pos-
sible the division of a larger pie irrespective of how it is sliced. For this
reason it is often said that bilateral monopoly leads to merger. Fixing
a resale price (the dealer margin determining the division of shares) is
a conceivable substitute for merger in achieving joint maximization.
For this purpose it is necessary that a particular price be set. Setting
a minimum price is insufficient unless for practical purposes the mini-
mum price will become the going price. 9
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF CONDITIONS FAVORABLE
TO RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The interest of dealers in resale price maintenance is that of reduc-
ing price competition. To be successful for this purpose it is necessary
that competing products and competing dealers be kept under control.
If competing products can also be put under resale price maintenance
or product differentiation encouraged, the effect of competition from
those products will be minimized. A rigorous enforcement of the main-
tained prices under the "fair-trade" laws is necessary to prevent com-
petition from dealers who do not maintain price. Insofar as resale price
maintenance is successful in eliminating price competition among
dealers, competition in non-price areas, such as service and conven-
ience, is increased, and the entry of new dealers is made more attractive.
Low-cost, non-service dealers whose merchandising policies involve
high turnover and low mark-ups are prevented from selling price-
maintained merchandise at low margins.
Most manufacturers do not find resale price maintenance in their
interest because it is inconsistent with selling the most merchandise at
the lowest possible cost. Dealer competition forces the development of
I Consult, for example, Stigler, The Theory of Price 241 (1952); or Fellner, Compe-
tition among the Few 244 (1949).
In the extreme case-a single buyer and a single seller--setting a minimum resale price
would leave the reseller free to raise his sale price to the detriment of the original seller.
This would make for the sale of a smaller quantity of product and consequent lower prices
than is consistent with joint maximization.
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efficient merchandising methods, making for lower retail prices and
greater sales without reducing per-unit return to manufacturers. Manu-
facturers support resale price maintenance, however, under conditions
which in economic terms may involve (a) dealer monopoly and com-
peting manufacturers, (b) bilateral monopoly (monopoly by dealers
and by manufacturers), and (c) monopoly in manufacturing and com-
petition among dealers. Each of these requires special conditions before
price maintenance can be effective. Price maintenance appears to be
incompatible with an assumption of pure competition among both
sellers and resellers. In economic terms it is the "monopoly" aspect of
markets rather than the "competitive" aspect which is most relevant to
an understanding of the motivations for resale price maintenance. This
is so whether a particular use of resale price maintenance has come
about through coercion by dealers, as a result of bargaining between
organized dealers and organized manufacturers, or as a means of
assuring performance of essential dealer services.
Both the methods and the objectives of resale price maintenance are
limited by the application of antitrust law to horizontal agreements.
For this reason, many present uses of resale price maintenance are un-
questionably subject to legal attack. Not all departures from conditions
of "free and open competition," however, involve violation of the anti-
trust laws under current standards. Insofar as resale price maintenance
achieves its objectives, whether or not it falls within the scope of the
antitrust laws, it has an anti-competitive effect on the economy.
To state that the practice of maintaining prices for resale involves a
departure from the conditions posited by competitive analysis is not to
solve the question of whether the practice should be prohibited or per-
mitted, even for those who are willing to assume that competition is an
evaluative as well as descriptive device. Insofar, however, as resale
price maintenance can be shown to make for more or for less competi-
tion than would prevail were it prohibited, then at least one guidepost
to public policy may be clarified.
II. EFFECT OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ON PRICES
Proponents of fair-trade laws argue that resale price maintenance
does not eliminate competition or raise prices. The analysis to this point
concludes that resale price maintenance is inconsistent with competi-
tion. Another, and possibly more convincing evaluation, involves em-
pirical evidence as to the actual effect of resale price maintenance in
terms of the prices charged.
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A. Prior Studies
If, as has been suggested, resale price maintenance can be expected
to make for less rather than more competition, it is reasonable to expect
that its use would make for higher consumer prices. A number of price
studies have been undertaken in an effort to show the price effects of
resale price maintenance. Some show higher prices, some lower. The
general conclusion has been that more evidence is needed.
One type of price study involves the measurement of magnitudes of
price increases over periods of time. This kind of study indicates that
in those periods in which prices are generally rising, prices increased
less on fair-traded products than on non-fair-traded products.7° The
evidence indicates, for example, that the consumer price index (exclu-
sive of rent) rose 96 per cent from the middle 1930's (1935-1939
average) to 1951. In contrast the price increases on selected "fair-
trade" items were:71
1935-1939 1951
Index Index
Two-slice Toastmaster .......... 100 (1936) 143.0
Aspirin Tablets ................ 100 100.3
Toothpaste .................... 100 140.8 (March)
Razor Blades .................. 100 106.4 (March)
All Prescriptions and Drugs ..... 100 128.0
Sanitary Napkins .............. 100 200.3 (March)
This kind of evidence, of course, does not indicate that fair-trade
prices are lower than non-fair-trade prices. It purports to show that
prices increase less on typically fair-traded items than on consumption
goods generally. But there is wide variation in the degree of price
change among both fair-traded and non-fair-traded items, and this
suggests an alternative explanation. In general, it can be shown that
the items which increase the least during a period of rising prices are
the items which fall the least during a period of falling prices. 2 There
is no evidence to indicate that the most rigid prices are the most com-
petitive prices.
If, for example, the cost of producing and distributing food rose as
much as the price of food (127 per cent), and the cost of producing
and distributing aspirin did not rise as the price of aspirin did not rise,
the price comparisons are readily explained by cost changes without
70 Op. dt. supra note 42, at 19. n Ibid.
7 'TNEC, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power Monograph No. 1, Price
Behavior and Business Policy, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 170 (1940).
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reference to fair trade. But if the cost of making and selling aspirin rose
more than the price, a departure from competitive conditions in the sale
of aspirin in the early period might be indicated; or, as Grether has
pointed out, resale price maintenance is not feasible when flexibility
characterizes retail price. 73 He suggests the gap between manufacturer's
price and price to consumers is necessarily wide to achieve the stability
to make price maintenance workable.74 These price index results are
not conclusive for the purpose of judging the effects of fair trade.
A second type of price study compares the legal minimum prices for
certain fair-trade products with the prices at which particular stores in
non-fair-trade areas sell these items. For example, a comparison in-
volving 208 typically fair-traded products sold by drug stores indicated
that retail margins and consumer prices were greater in fair-trade than
in non-fair-trade states.75 Similar best-buy studies have been made for
other fair-trade commodities in particular population centers with
similar results. For example, the St. Louis Star-Times in 1951 compared
liquor prices in St. Louis, Missouri, with prices across the river in
Illinois, finding the latter sixteen per cent higher than the former. 76
Studies of the type just described have been criticized because they
involve selective comparisons which distort or at least magnify the over-
all result in favor of resale price maintenance.
One of the most comprehensive studies of the effects of fair trade, the
Druggist Research Bureau study of 1941, indicates that fair trade does
not increase prices. The study surveyed prices on fifty fast-moving fair-
traded items sold in drug stores, reporting prices before fair trade (from
memory) and currently (1939). Reports from independent stores were
made on the prices at which the majority of sales were made, and chain
stores reported an average of everyday and an average of special prices.
Prices in the fair-trade states were found to have decreased slightly.
Prices were found to have increased after fair trading was begun in the
, Grether, Price Control under Fair Trade Legislation 283 (1939).
*Ibid.
'Hearings on Resale Price Maintenance before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 433 (1952). (Study referred to
was made by or for Mr. Rosenthal, owner of Standard Cut Rates store in Washington,
D.C.)
Established retail price for fair-trade states ............................ $945.10
Available selling price in non-fair-trade states (best buys) ................. $740.86
Retailers' gross profit computed on basis of fair-trade prices ............... 38.5%
Retailers' gross profit in non-fair-trade states computed on basis of best-buy
pnces .......................................................... 21.5%
Difference between fair-trade and best-buy prices ...................... 17.0%
SIbid., at 839.
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largest cities (three per cent), in chain stores (six per cent), and in
large independent stores in large cities (slightly). Prices were found to
have decreased in small stores and in small towns.
For several reasons there may be considerable doubt whether average
prices actually decreased, and whether, if they did, the decrease was
due to resale price maintenance. First, independent stores reported only
those prices at which most sales were made. It is at least possible that a
store making forty-nine per cent of its sales at cut prices before fair
trade and none of its sales at cut prices after fair trade would show a
"no-price-change" result. Second, the decreases (in the classes where de-
creases occurred) were as great in non-fair-trade states as in fair-trade
states. It is not shown whether dealer margins were made more favor-
able for small independents as against large chain buyers by passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 (and note the critical importance of
this date to the study under review). Independent study of selected
drug items does indicate that small buyers got better prices after 1936 . 7
Small stores may have passed these savings on to consumers. This
would make for price declines for independents (in contrast to chain
stores) irrespective of fair trade and is consistent with the findings of
the Druggist Research Bureau study indicating that prices for small
stores decreased in both fair-trade and non-fair-trade states.78
B. Nature of the Dentifrice Study
The data for the study of toothpaste prices were obtained from the
Market Research Corporation of America. This organization, to pro-
vide market data on consumer purchases to private clients, maintains
a national consumer panel of about 4,500 families, each of which keeps
a daily record of household purchases classified by product type, brand,
size, and price. Three states containing panel families, Texas, Missouri,
Vermont, in addition to the District of Columbia, have not had fair-
trade laws. This permits comparison of prices in non-fair-trade states
with those paid for the same goods in comparable fair-trade areas.
Op. cit. supra note 72, at 393.
A more recent study of the effects of fair trade on the prices of heavy-volume, fast-
moving drug items, was made by the A. C. Nielsen Co., covering the period March through
August, 1951. On the basis of bimonthly store audits of 70 sample stores in three non-
fair-trade states and the District of Columbia, as compared with sales in 700 sample stores
in the rest of the country, the weighted composite price (weighted in terms of dollar
volume) on 24 drug store items showed prices on the average to be slightly higher in the
non-fair-trade states than in the fair-trade states. A similar study had been made by this
company in 1949 with similar results.
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Panel families in the four non-fair-trade areas and in comparable fair-
trade areas were as follows:
Non-Fair Trade Fair Trade
Alabama, Louisiana, and
Texas .................... 181 Oklahoma .............. 258
Missouri .................. 132 Minnesota ................ 66
District of Columbia ....... 17 Baltimore ................ 39
Vermont ................. 8 New Hampshire ........... 11
Because of the limited number of panel families available there, and
because of the danger of introducing locational effects by combination
with western states, the District of Columbia, Vermont, Baltimore, and
New Hampshire were excluded. States finally included were Alabama,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Missouri, and Texas. The fair-
trade states were selected on the basis of total population, proportion
of urban and rural population'7  and geographical proximity. The 313
panel families from Texas and Missouri appeared quite comparable to
the 324 panel families from Alabama, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Min-
nesota.s0
Toothpaste is purchased by consumers fairly frequently and in small
quantities. The outlay at any one time is usually less than one dollar.8 '
Dentrifices are sold in various forms-pastes, powders, and liquids.
Some are ammoniated, and some contain chlorophyll or other special
29 PopurATIoN or CoupARABLE FAIz-TRADE AND
NoN-FAIR-TRADE SmTrs
Total Per Cent of
Population Population(milons) (towns 2500(1950 census) and over)
Texas ................... 7.7 63%
Alabama* 1
Louisana*.- ............. 8.0 50%
Oklahoma*I
Missouri................ 4.0 61%
nnesota* ............. 3.0 55%
* Fair-trade states.
The national consumer panel was not designed for accurate representation of individual
states or minor geographical subdivisions. The sample (originally a quota sample, later
gradually transferred into a probability sample) was designed to represent only broad geo-
graphic areas. One result of this is that the number of rural as contrasted to urban fami-
lies is greater in the areas compared than in the national totals. Consequently, weights
have been assigned to the different size places to approximate national proportions.
I The groups compared were similar in terms of family composition, income, and edu-
cation. See Appendix Table 7.
'In these respects the dentifrice study covers a product fairly typical of the items in-
cluded in the Druggist Research Bureau study. In addition, an attempt has been made to
isolate the possible effects of price maintenance by controlling for geographic area, com-
munity size, type of outlet and comparable time periods without depending upon memory
with respect to long-past purchases.
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ingredients. They are also sold in a wide range of sizes. About seventy-
five per cent of all dentifrice purchases are of so-called regular tooth-
paste."2 Dentifrices with special ingredients, or in liquid or powder
form, together account for the remaining twenty-five per cent. The
study was confined to regular toothpastes price-maintained in fair-trade
states at 63, 47, or 27 cents.8 3 Within each of the three size categories
of 63, 47, and 27 cents, the major price-maintained brands were com-
bined.8" Brands included account for more than ninety per cent of regu-
lar toothpaste sales and more than two-thirds of all dentifrice sales.
Toothpaste sales are made in food stores, drug stores, dime stores,
and by mail-order houses and door-to-door salesmen. The most impor-
tant outlets are food and drug stores. All other outlets have been com-
bined in this study to form a third category.
The data in the study are also analyzed in terms of community size.
Purchases by families living in cities of 10,000 population and over are
compared to purchases by families living in places of less than 10,000
inhabitants.
Data analyzed include purchases made between January 1, 1951, and
January 31, 1953. During this period the legal status of resale price
maintenance was changed twice: first, by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.5 in May,
1951, and second, by passage of the Federal Fair Trade Act (Mc-
Guire Act) 6 in July, 1952. The Schwegmann case made resale price
maintenance unenforceable against dealers who had not signed price-
maintenance contracts. Prior to this decision the great majority of
dealers had not signed such contracts; they were thought to be bound
by simple notice from the manufacturer. The McGuire Act provided
" The Market Research Corporation of America survey of dentifrice purchases in the
United States for January--September, 1951 indicates that 74.3 per cent of total sales were
regular pastes; all others, 25.7 per cent. Sales of regular pastes by the three largest selling
brands comprised 63.4 per cent of the dollar value of all dentifrice sales in this period.
TooT'ASTE VoLuE BY SIzE or TUBE
FOR THE U4ITED STATES
Per Cent
Fair-Trade Per Cent of Value
Size Price of Sales of Sales
"Economy".......... 63$ 28 40
"Giant.............47 37 40
"Large:: ............. 27l 31 19
"Small ............. 10 4 1
Total.................... 100% 100%
Source: Mlarket Research Corporation of America.
U No changes in list prices were made during the whole period under review for the
toothpastes included in this study.
-341 U.S. 384 (1951).
- 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp., 1952).
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enabling legislation binding non-signers in states having fair-trade
laws.8
7
The study, therefore, analyzes the toothpaste data in fair-trade and
non-fair-trade states in terms of tube size, type of outlet, community
size, and time period.8
C. Conclusions
1. Lack of Adherence to Maintained Prices. A high proportion of
toothpaste sales in both fair-trade and non-fair-trade states is made at
prices below the stipulated minimums-almost one half of the sales in
non-fair-trade states and more than one third in fair-trade states.8 9
Substantial sales were also made above minimum established prices in
both fair-trade and non-fair-trade statesf 0 These results are unchanged
when the data are measured in terms of value of sales rather than
number of sales.9 The high percentage of sales made below minimum
" Twenty states have upheld the constitutionality of non-signer clauses. In seven states,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, and Utah, the application of
state fair-trade laws to non-signing dealers has been held to violate the state constitution.
See 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 3085 (10th ed., 1954).
'Appendix Table 4 indicates the distribution of purchases in each tube size in each of
the 18 resulting categories.
' In the non-fair-trade states, 49 per cent of all sales for the entire period covered were
made at prices below the minimum maintained prices in the fair-trade states. 36 per cent
of all sales were made below minimum prices in fair-trade states.
, In both fair-trade and non-fair-trade states, less sales were made above minimum
prices than below minimum prices. The proportion of sales above minimum was higher
among non-fair-trade states than for fair-trade states--for fair-trade states, 17 per cent;
for non-fair-trade states, 24 per cent. The difference here arises principally because of the
high proportion of 2?-cent pastes sold in non-fair-trade states for more than 27 cents.
(See Appendix Table 1C.)
"' The following table indicates percentages above and below minimum prices in terms
of number of sales of all tube sizes and in terms of value of all sales for fair-trade and
non-fair-trade states:
Non-Fair
Fair Trade Trade
Sales below minimum price .................... 36% 49%
Value of sales below minimum fair-trade value... 30% 43%
Sales above minimum price .................... 17% 249'
Value of sales above minimum fair-trade value... 17% 246
Note: City sales weighted .68; town and rural sales .32.
Source: Appendix Tables 2A and 2B.
The percentage of number of sales above and below minimum prices in fair-trade and
non-fair-trade states for each tube size was as follows:
PzR CENT OF SAs PEE CENT oF SArIS
Bzow MIN.* ABovz Afn, .*
Minimum Non-Fair Non-Fair
Price Fair Trade Trade Fair Trade Trade
63 ............... 36% S7% 12% 9%
47.............. 27% 47% 28% 309',
27.............. 40% 39% 11% 32f,
* Weighted: cities .68, towns and rural .32.
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prices in fair-trade states emphasizes widespread lack of adherence to
maintained prices in toothpaste sales.
2. Higher Prices in Fair Trade States. Fair trading makes for sig-
nificantly higher toothpaste prices.92 This was true before and after the
outlawing of the non-signer clause by the Schwegmann case and before
and after the passage of the McGuire Act."' The conclusion holds also
in cities and in smaller communities, 94 and for food stores, drug stores,
and other outlets.95 This result, however, is occasioned by price differ-
ences among large paste sizes (63- and 47-cent pastes) and is not true
of the 27-cent size.9 6
3. Lower Prices in Cities. Toothpaste prices are lower in cities than
in towns and rural areas in both fair-trade and non-fair-trade states 7
Here again this result reflects prices of the larger size pastes and is not
true of the smaller size. Non-fair-trade prices are lower than fair-trade
prices in both large and small communities but the difference tends to
be greater in the former.
4. Minor Differences by Type of Outlet. The role of the drug-store
'-Consumers living in non-fair-trade states paid on the average 42.2 cents for tooth-
pastes which would have cost 44.7 cents had all sales been made at the maintained mini-
mum prices. Prices paid by these consumers were on the average 5.6 per cent below mini-
mum prices.
Consumers living in fair-trade states paid on the average 44.9 cents for toothpastes
which would have cost 46.6 cents had all sales been made at the maintained minimum
prices. Prices paid by these consumers were on the average 3.6 per cent below minimum
prices.
" See note 100 infra. ' See note 97 infra. ' See note 98 infra.
"The lower average prices paid for toothpaste in non-fair-trade as contrasted to fair-
trade states reflects the effect of lower prices paid for the 63-cent and 47-cent sizes in
non-fair-trade states. On the 27-cent size, differences in prices between fair-trade and non-
fair-trade states were negligible, but the average price paid for 27-cent pastes was slightly
higher in non-fair-trade than in fair-trade states.
AVERAGE ParcE PAO BY TUBE Siz
Tube Non-Fair
Size Fair Trade Trade Difference
63 ............. 6o. 1 S7.6l -2. 5,
47 ............. 46. 1 44.1 -2.04
27 ............. 26.4e 26.7 +0.
3
The average price paid for the 63-cent size was 4.2 per cent lower in non-fair-trade states
than in fair-trade states; for the 47-cent size, 4.3 per cent lower; and for the 27-cent size,
1.1 per cent higher. See Appendix Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C. The actual distribution of price
paid for each tube size in fair-trade as compared to non-fair-trade states is shown in
Appendix Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C.
mIn fair-trade states purchasers living in cties paid 46.9 cents on the average for pastes
the price of which would have been 49.1 cents had all purchases been made at the mini-
mum maintained price. Fair-trade purchasers living in smaller places paid nearly the same
average price they would have paid if all sales had been made at the minimum maintained
prices, the difference being one-half cent or 0.5 per cent below average price minimum.
The effect of community size on toothpaste purchases in non-fair-trade states is similar
to that in fair-trade states. Purchasers living in non-fair-trade cities paid 3.6 cents (7.7
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trade in sponsoring fair-trade legislation might create a presumption
that drug stores cannot or do not cut prices as frequently or as much as
other outlets. The study, however, does not indicate that toothpaste
prices are more strictly maintained in drug stores than in food stores or
other outlets either in fair-trade or non-fair-trade states. Average price
differences among outlet types are not great, but there is reason to be-
lieve that among the three comparisons made-food stores with drug
stores, drug stores with other stores, and food stores with other stores-
that food-store prices are on the average higher, not lower, than drug-
store prices0 8
5. Effect of Schwegmann Case and McGuire Act. It might be ex-
pected that prices in the fair-trade states would be lowered as a result
of the Schwegmann decision, holding that non-signers were not obliged
to maintain prices. The McGuire Act, which reinstituted the non-signer
clause, might be expected to have the opposite effect. The Schwegmann
case did have the effect of lowering toothpaste prices in fair-trade
states; 9 this result was not counteracted during the six-month period
per cent) less than they would have paid if all purchases had been at the minimum main-
tained prices. The difference in smaller places was 1.4 cents (3.4 per cent).
The following table indicates the frequency of purchases among toothpaste sizes in fair-
trade and non-fair-trade states in terms of community size:
FAIR-TRADE STATES Now-Fmnt-TRADE STATES
Aver. Per Cent of Sales Aver. Per Cent of Sales
Tube Community No. of Price Below Above No. of Price Below Above
Size Size Purchases Paid Min. Min. Purchases Paid Min. Min.
63 .... Cities 437 59.3 42 10 303 56.61l 59 6
Towns and Rural 233 61.6 24 15 185 59.6 52 16
47 .... Cities 345 45.4l 31 17 445 43.3e 51 22
Towns and Rural 385 47.4 19 50 429 45.6 40 45
270 .... Cities 241 26.5f 32 11 251 27.O 32 35
Towns and Rural 492 26.2 57 12 436 26.2 53 25
The lower average toothpaste prices in larger as contrasted to smaller communities re-
sults from the fact that a larger proportion of sales was made at higher than minimum
prices in small places, and from the fact that proportionately more of the larger size
pastes, more often sold at below-minimum prices, were sold in cities.
v A AGE R PRicEs PAID PoR ToopASTE By T=rz o OuTLxT
(All Communities,* All Periods)
FAIR-TRADE STATES Noi r-FAr.-TRADE STATzs
Per Cent Per Cent
of Sales of Sales
Tube Aver. Below Above Aver. Below Above
Size Outlet Price Min. Miin. Price Min. Min.
631 .... Food Stores 60.4 37 19 58.3f 57 9
Drug Stores 60.1 39 8 58.0 55 11
Other 59.5 35 7 54.6 61 9
47 .... Food Stores 46.2 25 31 44.5f 48 32
Drug Stores 45.9 28 28 44.0 49 27
Other 45.4 31 22 42.9 44 172 7 1 
.... Food Stores 26.5f 39 10 26.8f 37 32
Drug Stores 26.3 42 11 26.7 49 25
Other 26.3 38 15 26.5 40 30
* Weighted: .68 cities, .32 towns and rural.
oThe fact that prices in non-fair-trade states were not lowered after the Schwegmann
case corroborates this conclusion.
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following the passage of the McGuire Act.'00 Prices in non-fair-trade
states, however, in both period 2 and period 3, continued to be lower
than in fair-trade states.
6. Significance of Price Differences. The magnitude of the difference
between prices paid in fair-trade and non-fair-trade states over the en-
tire period surveyed (January, 1951 to January, 1953) in terms of per-
centage above or below the fair-trade price was -4.2 per cent on 63-
cent pastes, -4.3 per cent on 47-cent pastes, and +1.1 per cent on 27-
cent pastes. These percentages reflect the fact that even in fair-trade
states the actual prices were on the average 3.6 per cent below the
established minimums.
In summary, the significant differences in toothpaste prices are be-
tween fair-trade and non-fair-trade states, between cities and smaller
places, and between prices before and after the Schwegmann case in
fair-trade states. In each of these comparisons, the differences are con-
sistent among the subcategories which they include, greatly reducing-
probability of chance result.1 1
100 AVERAGE PRiCES PAID rOR TOOT'ASTE BY:PERIODS
(All Communities,* All Outlets)
FAir-TRADR STATEs No-FArm-TRADE STATES
Per Cent Per Cent
of Sales of Sales
Tube Peri- Aver. Below Above Aver. Below Above
Size od** Price Min. Min. Price Min. Min.
630 ....... 1 61.20 25 4 56.2t 53 2
2 59.3 37 8 57.4 57 7
3 60.7 40 24 58.8 58 17
470 ....... 1 47.36 11 30 44.4 47 33
2 46.1 27 29 44.1 44 32
3 45.2 37 24 43.4 55 22
27o ....... 1 26.3f 43 16 26.6f 48 30
2 26.2 43 9 26.6 35 30
3 27.0 30 13 27.3 39 40
* Weighted .68 cities, .32 towns and rural.
**Period 1: Prior to Schwegmann case.
Period 2: Subsequent to Schwegmann case and prior to McGuire Act.
Period 3: Subsequent to McGuire Act.
10 1 See Appendix Tables 8 through liB.
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TABLE 3A
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE OF TOOTHPASTE PURCHASES BY
PRICE IN FAIR-TRADE AND NoN-FAIR-TRADE STATES (UN-
WEIGHTED FOR URBAN AND NON-URBAN PLACES) (ALL
SIZE PLACES, ALL OUTLETS, AuL PERIODS)
63 Size
FAIR Ta
Number
of Pur-
chasesPIcE
34 ............
35 .............
37 .............
38 .............
39 .............
40 .............
42 .............
43 .............
44 .............
45 .............
46 .............
47 .............
48 .............
49 .............
50 .............
51 .............
52 .............
53 .............
54 .............
55 .............
56 .............
57 .............
58 .............
59 .............
60 .............
61 .............
62 .............
63 .............
64 .............
65 .............
66 .............
67 .............
69 .............
75 .............
79 .............
89 .............
All .........
ADE NoN-FAI TRADE
Number
of Pur-
Pct. chases Pct.
3 0.6
1 0.2
0.1 4 0.8
7 1.4
1.0 13 2.7
1 0.2
0.3
0.4 18 3.7
0.1 4 0.8
0.6 8 1.6
0.4 3 0.6
1.9 8 1.6
2.1
6.0 "2 5.5
1.4 9 1.8
1.6 ... .....
4.5
1.9 6 1.2
1 0.2
0.4 18 3.7
0.1 3 0.6
1.0 18 3.7
3 0.6
11.0 112 23.0
1.4 3 0.6
1.2 ...
0.3 5 1.0
52.9 165 34.0
0.4 1 0.2
1.0 8 1.6
0.1 .. .
0.7 4 0.8
8.9 34 7.1
0.1 1 0.2
0.1 ... .....
0.1 ... .....
100.0 488 100.0
TABLE 3B
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE OF TOOTHPASTE PURCHASES BY
PRICE IN FAIR-TRADE AND NoN-FAIR-TRADE STATES (UN-
WEIGHTED FOR URBAN AND NON-URBAN PLACES) (ALL
SIZE PLACES, ALL OUTLETS, ALL PERIODS)
47 Size
FAIRs
Number
of Pur-
chasesPRICE
25 ............
26 .............
27 .............
28 .............
29 .............
30 .............
31 .............
32 .............
33 .............
34 .............
35 .............
36 .............
37 .............
38 .............
39 .............
40 .............
41 .............
42 .............
43 .............
44 .............
45 .............
46 .............
47 .............
48 .............
49 .............
50 .............
51 .............
52 .............
53 .............
54 .............
55 .............
57............
59............
60 .............
63 .............
69 .............
An .........
ADE NoN-FPAm TRADE
Number
of Pur-
Pct. chases Pct.
8 0.9
3 0.3
0.7 8 0.9
8 0.9
0.3 30 3.4
0.1 1 0.1
0.1 5 0.6
0.3 1 0.1
0.4 29 3.3
1.8 3 0.3
1.1 7 0.8
11 1.3
3.0 23 2.6
0.4 3 0.3
2.6 36 4.1
0.3 6 0.7
0.4 17 1.9
0.5 3 0.3
9.9 124 14.2
0.3 1 0.1
1.9 74 8.5
0.5
41.0 i83 21.1
0.1 3 0.3
10.3 83 9.5
18.6 178 20.6
1.1
0.1 2 0.2
0.8 9 1.0
0.3
1.0 " 0.8
0.4
0.8 " 0.6
0.3
0.3 2 .2
0.3 1 0.1
100.0 874 100.0
TABLE13C
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE OF TOOTHPASTE PURCHASES BY
PRICE IN FAIR-TRADE AND NON-FAIR-TRADE STATES (UN-
WEIGHTED FOR URBAN AND NON-URBAN PLACES) (AiL
SIZE PLACES, ALL OUTLETS, ALL PERIODS)
27 Size
FAIR TRA
Number
of Pur-
chases
R NON-FAI TRADE
Number
of Pur-
Pct. chases Pct.
100... ........
12 .............
13 .............
15 .............
16 .............
18 .............
19 .............
20 .............
22 .............
23 .............
24 .............
25 .............
26 .............
27 .............
28 .............
29 .............
30 ........ ....
31 .............
33 .............
35 .............
37 .............
39 .............
43 .............
50 .............
All .........
0.10.1
0.4
0.3
0.9
0.1
46.4
0.1
39.8
1.5
7.4
1.6
1.9
0.3
0.1
100.0
1
6
21
4
3
2
275
2
179
10
158
22
1
11
1
1
1
1
0.1
0.9
0.3
0.1
0.6
0.4
2.2
0.3
40.1
0.3
26.2
1.5
23.1
3.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
687 100.0
PRICE
TABLE 4
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF PURCHASES*
(In Each of 3 Periods, by Community Size, by Type of Outlet)
FAIR TRADE NoN-FAIr TRADE
63s 47 27 631  47j 27e
Period 1: 114 131 135 88 169 166
Cities: 72 66 40 54 87 60
Food stores .... 13 26 14 30 51 46
Drug stores .... 49 18 14 19 24 8
Other ......... 10 22 12 5 12 6
Towns and rural: 42 65 95
Food stores.... 8 36 44
Drug stores .... 32 15 8
Other ......... 2 14 43
Period 2: 347 396 443
Cities: 221 182 149
Food stores .... 92 88 91
Drug stores .... 85 68 31
Other ......... 44 26 27
Towns and rural: 126 214 294
Food stores .... 36 124 143
Drug stores .... 64 56 32
Other ......... 26 34 119
Period 3: 209 203 155
Cities: 144 97 52
Food stores .... 64 51 36
Drug stores .... 45 33 11
Other ......... 35 13 5
Towns and rural: 65 106 103
Food stores .... 28 71 60
Drug stores .... 24 13 10
Other ......... 13 22 33
All Periods: 670 730 733
Cities: 437 345 241
Food stores .... 169 165 141
Drug stores .... 179 119 56
Other ......... 89 61 44
Towns and rural: 233 385 492
Food stores.... 72 231 247
Drug stores ... 120 84 50
Other ......... 41 70 195
106
75
12
19
482
149
* Purchases at special deal prices authorized by the manufacturers have been excluded. (See
Appendix Table 5 for effect of this exclusion.)
34 82
15 48
12 20
7 14
244 479
154 257
85 161
48 65
21 31
90 222
61 165
20 30
9 27
156 226
95 101
46 74
27 11
22 16
61 125
38 91
14 13
9 21
488 874
303 445
161 286
94 100
48 59
185 429
114 304
46 63
25 62
TABLE 5
TOOTHPASTE PURCHASES EXCLUDED FROM THE STUDY BECAUSE
OF AUTHORIZED EXCEPTIONS AS "SPECIAL DEALS"
630 Srza 470 Siz= 27l SIz
Fair- Non-Fair- Fair- Non-Fair- Fair- Non-Fair-
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
States States States States States States
No. of "deal" sales--cities.. 0 11 28 99 21 6
No. of "deal" sales-towns
and rural .............. 0 1 30 58 8 0
Total "deal" sales .... 0 12 58 157 29 6
Aver. price on "deal" sales
--- cities ....................... 42.9 34.1 32.1k 17.6 15.5
Aver. price on "deal" sales
-towns and rural .............. 59.0 34.5 33.5 15.5 .........
Aver. price all "deal" sales ........ 44.3 34.3 32.60 17.00 15.5
TABLE 6
AvERAGE PRICES PAID FOR TOOTHPASTES IN PARTICULAR
FAIR-TRADE AND NoN-FAIR-TRADE STATES
All Size Places (Unweighted),
All Outlets, by Periods
63j PAsras
Non-Fair
47 PAsTas
Non-Fair
Fair Trade Trade Fair Trade Trade
Period 1:
Minnesota .......... 61.4  ....... 47.1 ........
Missouri .......... ....... 56.9. ....... 45.5
Ala., La., Okla ....... 61.1 ........ 47.9
Texas ................... 56.6 ........ 45.8
Baltimore ........... 63.0** ....... 39.5**
Dist. of Col ....... ....... 61.1 ....... 37.8**
Period 2:
Minnesota .......... 61.2 ....... 46.8 .
Missouri .......... ....... 57.7 ....... 44.0
Ala., La., Okla ....... 58.4 46.8
Texas ............ ....... 58.6 ....... 45.8
Baltimore ........... 61.0 44.7*
Dist. of Col ........ ....... 60.4 ....... 42.7
Period 3:
Minnesota ..........
Missouri ..........
Ala., La., Okla .......
Texas ............
Baltimore ...........
Dist. of Col ........
61.7 *
59.4
61.6*
61.0 *
57.6
61.4*
48.5 *
47.1
46.1*
45.90
44.9
45.0**
Based on less than 10 purchases.
* Based on from 10 to 20 purchases.
Note: These supplementary data are included because of their possible relevance to a
question of whether the differences shown between fair-trade and non-fair-trade prices are
to be explained by the location of the states included in the study.
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL CONSUMER PANEL
FAMILIES WITHIN SELECTED NON-FAIR- AND
FAIR-TRADE AREAS
Alabama,
Texas and Louisiana,
Missouri Minnesota,
(Non-Fair Oklahoma
Trade) (Fair Trade)
Area total ....................... 100% 100%
City size:
Farm and-2,500 ............... 39 40
2,500- 50,000 .............. 16 18
50,000-250,000 .............. 9 10
250,000 plus .................. 36 32
Age of houtsewife:
-35 years ................... 20 20
35-44 years ................... 27 27
45-54 years ................... 12 13
55 and over ................... 41 40
Family size:
I and 2 members ............... 37 32
3 members ................... 22 22
4 and 5 members .............. 29 31
6 plus ........................ 12 15
Education of adult head:
Grade School .................. 56 52
High School ................... 29 30
College ....................... 15 17
Occupation of adult head:
Professional and executive ...... 20 18
Clerical and service ............ 17 21
Skilled labor .................. 18 14
Unskilled .................... 17 16
Farmer ....................... 15 17
Other ........................ 13 14
Children by age groups:
No children ................... 46 45
Children7-12 only ............. 25 28
Children 13-20 only, plus 13-20
and -6 or 6-12 .............. 25 22
Children in all 3 age groups (-6,
6-12, 12-20) ................. 4 5
Totaifamily incomie:
-$3,000 ................. 37 40
$3,000-$6,000 ................. 48 43
$6,000 plus ................... 15 17
869
TABLE 8
FAIR-TRADE-NON-FAIR-TRADE COMPARISONS
63j PASTES* 47 PAsrEst 270 PASTESt
F.T. N.F.T. F.T. N.F.T. F.T. N.F.T.
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
CoMMUNITY Price Price Price Price Price Price
RIOD SIZE OUTLET Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
..... Cities Food x .. x .. x
Drug x .. x .. .. x
Other x .. x .. .. x
Towns and rural Food x x .. .. x
Drug x .. x .. X
Other x . x x...
.Cities Food x x .. x
Drug x x .. x
Other x x ..x
Towns and rural Food x x .. x
Drug x x .. x
Other x x ..X
..... Cities Food x x .. x
Drug x x ..X
Other x .. x .. x
Towns and rural Food x .. x X
Drug .. x x .. x
Other .. x .. x .. x
Totals ........................ 16 2 17 1 8 10
* Source: Appendix Table IA.
t Source: Appendix Table lB.
* Source: Appendix Table IC.
TABLE 9
CITY-ToWN AND RuRAL COMPARISONS
63 PASTES*
Town and
Rural City
F.T. or Prices Prices
PEROD N.F.T. OUTLET Higher Higher
1.... F.T. Food x
Drug x
Other (no difference)
N.F.T. Food .. x
Drug x
Other x
2.... F.T. Food x
Drug x
Other x
N.F.T. Food x
Drug x
Other x
3.... F.T. Food x
Drug .. x
Other .. x
N.F.T. Food x
Drug x
Other x
Totals ............ 14 3
* Source: Appendix Table IA.
t Source: Appendix Table IB.
t Source: Appendix Table IC.
470 PASTES t
Town and
Rural City
Prices Prices
Higher Higher
X
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
X .
18 0
27 PASTESI
Town and
Rural City
Prices Prices
Higher Higher
X
X
X
X
X
(no difference)
X
X
X
X
.x
x .
.x
.. X
2 15
1.
2.
3.
Cities:
Period 1 F.T ........ x
N.F.T ...... x
Period 2 F.T ........
N.F.T ...... x
Period 3 F.T......... x
N.F.T ......
(subtotals) ........ 4)
Towns and rural:
Period 1 F.T......... x
N.F.T ......
Period 2 F.T ........
N.F.T...... x
Period 3 F.T ......... x
N.F.T ....... x
(subtotals) ........ (4)
Totals ............ 8
* Source: Appendix Table IA.
t Source: Appendix Table lB.
t Source: Appendix Table IC.
TABLE 10A
DRUG STORE-FOOD STORE COMPARISONS
634 SszE* 474 Smzst
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
Price Price Price Price
in Food in Drug in Food in Drug
Stores Stores Stores Stores
Hicher Higher Hieher Higher
X
.. X
X .
X .
.. X(no difference)
(3) (2)
7 4
274 SizEt
Aver. Aver.
Price Price
in Food in Drug
Stores Stores
Higher Higher
(no difference)
(5) 2o)
9 2
TABLE 10B
DRUG STORE-OTHER (NON-FOOD) COMPARISONS
634 Srz* 474 ScEt
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
Price Price Price Price
in Drug in Other in Drug in Other i
Stores Stores Stores Stores
Higher Higher fieher Rrher
Cities:
Period 1 F.T ........ x
N.F.T ...... x
Period 2 F.T......... x
N.F.T ....... x
Period 3 F.T......... x
N.F.T ...... x
(subtotals) ........ (5) (1)
Towns and rural:
Period 1 F.T ......... .. x
N.F.T ...... x .
Period 2 F.T ......... x
N.F.T ....... (no difference)
Period 3 F.T......... x
N.F.T ....... x
(subtotals) ........ (3) (2)
Totals ............ 8 3
* Source: Appendix Table lA.
t Source: Appendix Table IB.
t Source: Appendix Table 1C.
274 SIZE
Aver. Aver.
Price Price
n Drug in Other
Stores Stores
Higher Higher
X
.. X
.°X x
(no difference)
X
(4)
5 6
. ... O ... ......
TABLE 10C
FOOD STORE-OTHER (NON-DRUG) COMPARISONS
634 SizE* 474 SizUt 274 SIz 4
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
Price Price Price Price Price Price
in Food in Other in Food in Other in Food in Other
Stores Stores Stores Stores Stores Stores
Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
Cities:
Period I F.T ............ x x x
N.F.T ...... x .. x .. .. x
Period 2 F.T ...... .. x x .. .. x
N.F.T ...... x .. x . x
Period 3 F.T......... x .. x .. .. x
N.F.T ....... x x x
(subtotals) ........... ) (2) (6) (4) ()
Towns and rural:
Period 1 F.T..........x .. .. x x
N.F.T ........... x x x
Period 2 F.T ......... x .. x .. x
N.F.T ....... x .. .. x x
Period 3 F.T......... x .. x .. x
N.F.T ....... x x x
(subtotals) ........ (4) (2) (3) (3) 65) (1)
Totals ............ 8 4 9 3 7 5
* Source: Appendix Table IA.
t Source: Appendix Table lB.
t Source: Appendix Table IC.
TABLE 11A
EFFECT OF Schwegmann CASE ON PRICES IN FAIR-TRADE
AND NON-FAIR-TRADE STATES
(Period 1-Period 2 Comparisons in Fair-Trade States)
634 SIzs* 474 Sz t  274 Srz zAver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
Price Price Price Price Price Price
in Period 1 in Period 2 in Period 1 in Period 2 in Period 1 in Period 2
Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
F.T. cities:
Food stores ......... x .. x .. x
Drug stores ......... x .. x .. x
Other ............... x .. x ....
F.T. towns and rural:
Food stores ......... x .. x .. .. x
Drug stores ......... x .. x .. .. x
Other .............. x .. x .... x
Totals ............ 6 0 6 0 2 4
872
TABLE 11A-Coninued
(Period 1-Period 2 Comparisons in Non-Fair-Trade States)
63f SzE* 47l SizEt 27f Sizg
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
Price Price Price Price Price Price
in Period I in Period 2 in Period 1 in Period 2 in Period I in Period 2
Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
N.F.T. cities:
Food stores ......... x
Drug stores ......... x
Other stores .........
N.F.T. towns and rural:
Food stores .........
Drug stores ......... x
Other stores .........
Totals ............ 3
* Source: Appendix Table IA.
t Source: Appendix Table lB.
t Source: Appendix Table IC.
X
.. X
.. X
X
X
3 4 2 3 3
TABLE liB
EFFECT OF McGUIRE ACT ON PRICES IN FAIR-TRADE
AND NON-FAIR-TRADE STATES
(Period 2-Period 3 Comparisons in Fair-Trade States)
F.T. cities:
Food stores .........
Drug stores .........
Other ..............
F.T. towns and rural:
Food stores .........
Drug stores .........
Other ..............
Totals ............
63t SizE* 475 Sizat 27? SuzET
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
Price in Price in Price in Price in Price in Price in
Period 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2
Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
4
4 2 1
(Period 2-Period 3 Comparisons in Non-Fair-Tfade States)
PcPe
N.F.T. cities:
Food stores .........
Drug stores .........
Other ..............
N.F.T. towns and rural:
Food stores .........
Drug stores .........
Other ..............
Totals ............
* Source: Appendix Table IA.
t Source: Appendix Table lB.
Source: Appendix Table IC.
63t SZ* 47 Srznf 27t SizE
Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver. Aver.
rice in Price in Price in Price in Price in Price in
orid 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Pdriod 3 Period 2
[igher Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher
X
X .
X .
X X
X .. X..
X X
6 0 2 4 4 2
873
X
X
X .
